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As the composition of The Secret Agent neared its end, Joseph Conrad became 
increasingly defensive about his work. In his correspondence of 1906 and 1907, 
he repeatedly disclaims any philosophical, moral, or political sigdicance of the 
novel, insisting that anarchism was a wholly incidental element in his work. As 
a response to the contemporary attack on the "moral squalor of the tale" (7), 
Conrad in the "Author's Note" (1920) again attempts to "justify" his choice of 
anarchism and use of an "ironic method" (11). Asserting that "there was no 
perverse intention, no secret scorn for the natural sensibilities of mankind at  the 
bottom of my impulses," he proceeds to state that "applying an ironic method to 
a subject of that kind was formulated with deliberation and in the earnest belief 
that ironic treatment alone would enable me to say all I felt I would have to say 
in scorn as well as in pity" (11). 
Despite Conrad's contention that  he "haid] not intended to commit a 
gratuitous outrage on the feelings of mankind" (12), the narrator's scathing 
mockery of human beings - from anarchists, idiots, helpless women to civil 
authorities - has left critics conflicted about Conrad's pedagogical intention and 
the ethics of the novel. Irving Howe, for instance, deplored the novel's 
withholding of "a moral positive to serve literary ends" (96). Regarding the novel 
as "an inhuman game with human needs" (90-911, Anthony Winner states that 
it hardly offers any "moral education" (14). Although Mark A. Wollaeger 
acknowledges some complexities in the novel's use of irony, he still sees the 
narrator's view of the characters too harsh and inhuman (149, 154). For 
Wollaeger, the "overbearing presence of the narrator" reflects Conrad's desire for 
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"order" and "authorship" and the narrator's "monologic indifference to the fate of 
the characters" reveals the writei s intention to "take possession of them" (145, 
155). By contrast, J. Hillis Miller holds that the ultimate purpose of The Secret 
Agent is to teach the reader not to fall into "fatuous complacency" by 
encouraging the reader to be critical about the narrator's attitude toward the 
characters (44). 
In some sense, these criticisms are united in their view of irony as basically a 
series of techniques or strategies for "conveying the opposite of what one says," 
namely, what Ernst Behler and other scholars term "classical irony" (Behler 76). 
To borrow Behler's phrase, one of the fundamental characteristics of classical 
irony is the assumption of "perfect understanding between speaker and listener" 
and an "absolute notion of truth"(2). Obviously, this kind of irony abounds in 
The Secret Agent, ranging from verbal to dramatic or structural irony. For 
example, much of the irony in the novel turns on a "truth" about the anarchists 
that both the narrator and the reader are supposed to know, namely, their 
ineptitude or inability to revolt. In addition, a great deal of the narrative 
develops through the characters' ignorance or miscalculation of others' minds, 
motivations, or the entire situation. For example, Winnie Verloc's attempt to 
instill Verloc's absolute goodness in the mind of her half-witted, all-too-trusting 
brother Stevie turns out to be a fatal blunder, for it is Stevie's loyalty to Verloc 
that leads to his death by the bomb explosion. 
Does irony in The Secret Agent, however, function simply on the basis of the 
"absolute notion of truth?" Or, to put it differently, does irony in the novel 
operate in a fixed epistemological, moral, andlor political horizon? Our thinking 
on this question can be illuminated by recent studies of irony. For Alan Wilde, 
the "fundamental habit of defining irony essentially as a contrast between 
reality and appearance" and by implication, the tendency to assume the 
existence of an absolute truth underlying this discrepancy, is problematic in that 
it "rationaliz[esI" the "protean and elusive nature of irony" (4). With similar 
objections in mind, many theorists of irony have attempted to redefine or 
broaden the concept of irony by aligning it with "a mode of consciousness7' 
(Wilde), a modernist nihilistic worldview (Glic,ksberg), or an =ti-foundational 
l i terary mode tha t  registers the "necessity and the impossibility of 
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communication" (Behler). And yet, curiously, critical responses to Conrad's irony 
have largely remained tied to the classical notion of irony. 
Wilde's study suggests that these so-far conventional approaches to irony in 
The Secret Ageat have offered rather a limied understanding of both irony and 
the novel. In Horizons of Assent: Modernism, Postmodernism, and the Ironic 
Imagination, Wilde states that there has been a growing sense of difficulty in 
defining irony. Many scholars would generally agree that since Friedrich 
Schlegel characterized Goethe's Wilhelm Meister in terms of irony at the end of 
the eighteenth century, the concept of irony began to embrace something more 
than a figure of speech. A number of theorists, however, have proposed different 
perspectives on the conceptual, philosophical, ethical, or political features of 
irony as well as the relation between irony and literary romanticism, modernism 
and postmodernism. For example, Charles Glicksberg contends that the concept 
of irony has "evolve[d]" or been "transformed" throughout history from "a 
rhetorical device" through "romantic irony" to "metaphysical irony" (11). In his 
view, the metaphysical irony of twentieth century literature goes beyond both 
classical and romantic irony in that it expresses the nihilistic conviction that 
there is "no final explanation of the mystery of existence" (32). Like Glicksberg, 
Emst Behler also distinguishes the romantic irony (initiated by Schlegel) from 
"isolated ironic passages" (75). But unlike Glicksberg, who assumes semantic 
breaks between the ironies of different ages, Behler's emphasis on the dynamic, 
process-oriented character of irony leads to an association of irony with "the 
modern style of self-reflection and self-consciousness," namely, "literary 
modernity" (82). Taking a cue from Schlegel's definition of irony as  an  
"involuntary and yet completely deliberate dissimulation" that "contains and 
arouses a feeling of the indissoluble antagonism between . . . the impossibility 
and the necessity of complete communication" (75), Behler views Schlegel's irony 
as an attempt to "rescue" Socratic-Platonic irony - a form of irony that until the 
end of the eighteenth century had been obscured by the prevalence of another 
view of classical irony, a view that psesumed a "complete agreement" and 
"perfect understanding between speaker and listener and an absolute notion of 
t r u th  (81).') Characterizing Schlegel's irony as an "indeterminable . . . process of 
thinking and writing" through which "thought and counter-thought moves forth 
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in lively fashion," Behler proceeds to question the association of irony and 
rationalism that he detects in postmodern discourses (with the exception of Paul 
de Man)(83). Borrowing de Man's view of irony as one of the "innermost essence 
of literature," Behler defines irony as a "rupture," "a disruption of language 
which makes it impossible for the author to master his text and for the reader to 
register unambiguous reading protocols" (103). From this perspective, Jacques 
Derrida's "diE6rancen can be seen as "a continuation and reformulation of one of 
the central features of Schlegel's irony - "the impossibility and necessity of 
complete communication" (Behler 109). 
As Behler's study suggests, de Man's observations concerning irony have 
helped to reshape our understanding of irony. In his 1977 lecture titled "The 
Concept of Irony," de Man states that "it seems to be uncannily difficult to give a 
definition of irony" (164)' for irony is "not a concept" in the first place (167); 
rather, irony is "a performative system" bound up with "the impossibility of 
understanding" (167). For de Man, it is Schlegel's texts where the problem of 
irony - that of the "impossibility of understanding"- "really gets worked out." 
Schlegel's writing 'Wber dies Unverstandlichkeit" (which de Man translates as 
"On the Impossibility of Understanding," "On Incomprehensibility," or "On the 
Problem of the Impossibility of Understanding" 166-67) is an exemplary text 
that simultaneously deals with and enacts irony in its rigorous refusal to be 
I 
fixed to any single meaning (181). Taking another example from "Eine 
Reflexion" (A Reflection), a chapter in Schlegel's anecdotal roman a clef Lucinde 
that has notoriously irritated many readers including Kierkegaard and Hegel, 
de Man argues that what was really upsetting about this text was the "threat" 
that its philosophical "reflection on the very physical questions involved in 
sexual intercourse"(l68) poses to "all assumptions one has about what a text 
should be" through the mutual interruption and disruption of sexual and 
philosophical discourses (169). In this respect, de Man suggests, "Eine Reflexion" 
enacts the deconstructive performance of irony in its "dangerous" circles that 
1) Thus, while Glicksberg differentiates Somatic irony that, he believes, is based on the 
ironist's know1edge of the absolute truth from modernist irony based on nihilism and 
skepticism, Behler approaches Socratics irony in light of process and indeterminacy, 
thus regarding it as a of modern irony. 
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disrupt the desire "to stabilize, to control the trope" (167). 'What is at stake in 
irony," therefore, "is the possibility of understanding, the possibility of reading, 
the readability of texts, the possibility of deciding on a meaning or on a multiple 
set of meanings or on a controlled polysemy of meanings" (167). In sum, for de 
Man, irony is "a free play of the sigmf~er'' that goes beyond the intention of the 
speakerlwriter in its "sheer circulation" (181). 
This is not the place to enter into a detailed discussion of the possibilities and 
problems that each of these approaches to irony opens up, or of their differing 
assumptions about language, truth, meaning, and modernist aesthetics. Rather, 
I want to show that some recent theories of irony help us understand The Secret 
Agent form a new angle. This does not mean, of course, to confine the novel's 
irony to specific theoretical frame. On the contrary, while acknowledging the 
usefulness of these theoretical insights, I seek to refine them as well, by 
illuminating where they fail in explaining the complex epistemological and 
political significance of irony in the novel. As we shall see, my reading of irony in 
The Secret Agent  complicate^ Wilde's rather schematic distinction between a 
modernist irony - that he believes achieves "aesthetic closure" as a substitute 
for a lost paradise - and a postmodern irony - that he assumes takes the 
absurd and contingent world as  it is. Although the world in the novel is 
contingent and absurd, this does not mean that the novel conforms neatly to 
Wilde's formulation of postmodern irony. While irony in the novel is primarily 
propelled by a profound anguish about the absurdity of the world, it does not 
simply register a nostalgia for a lost paradise (as Wilde assumes) or a sense of 
sheer randomness and circulation. Borrowing de Man's words, irony in The 
Secret Agent resists the desire to "stabilize" by continuously interrogating the 
power embedded in the illusion of objective truth and meaning. But Conrad's 
irony pushes de Man's view of irony a step further by locating what de Man calls 
the "danger" of irony in a more concrete socio-political terrain, constantly 
interrogating the contingency and the desire for domination embedded in the 
illusory beliefs in truth, disinterested political commitment and moral decisions. 
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Many of Conrad's works portray a world devoid of any absolute, objective 
meaning or tnlth. For example, at the beginning uf Heart of Darlzness, we read: 
Marlow was not.typica1 (if his propensity to spin yarns be excepted), and 
to him the meaning of an episode was not inside like a keinc!l but outside, 
enveloping the tale which brought it; out only as a glow brings out a haze, 
in the likeness of one of these misty halos that so~netinles are made 
visible by the spectral illumination of moonshine. (20) 
The image of meaning as an envelope that S U I T I J U ~ ~ S  an episode reveals a sense 
of hollowness and the absence of any futed, transparent meaning, a sense that 
runs through the entire novel. This is not to say that the narrator here totally 
negates the existence of meaning. Rather, the image of "a haze" or "misty halos7' 
suggests that meaning is obscure and without solidity. In TIze Secret Agent, the 
world is filled with a sense of uncertainty. Most characters in the novel have 
murky origins. Verloc's Soho shop is full of "nondescript packages" (131, "box 
without apparently nothing inside" (14) and "the shadows of nondescript things" 
(54). The recurrent images of empty or nondescrip boxes and shadows intimate 
incomprehensibility and obscurity. Although the overt plot - a story about a 
failed bomb-attack on Greenwich Observatory - unravels the "truth," namely, 
the man behind this crime, the entire narrative constantly debunks the "notion 
of absolute truth" by exposing the will to domination implicated in any truth 
claim, while disrupting the "complete agreement" between the narrator and the 
reader as well. 
At this point, de Man's reading of Schlegel's observations concerning wit and 
mythology in light of "authentic language"(reel1e Sprache) is noteworthy as it 
makes possible for us to view Conrad's irony as a resistance to absolute truth. To 
begin with, Schlegel draws upon the image of a "glow" as something that allows 
the meaning of "the original nature and the original force" (which de Man 
translates into Kraft) "to shine through." Interestingly, Conrad also uses the 
image of a "glow" or "moonshine" that makes visible the meaning (however 
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misty it may be) of an "episode" or a "tale." More importantly, both Schlegel and 
Conrad's texts associate this "glow" with madness or absurdity instead of with 
reason. According to de Man, the "glow" here is a version of Schlegel's authentic 
language which Schlegel describes as "the strangely, even the absurd. . . 
childlike yet sophisticated naivety" or " "error, madness, and simpleminded 
stupidity" (180-81). In Conrad's passage the glow also connotes madness, as it 
turns to "moon~hine."~) In de Man's view, this language of madness for Schlegel 
is what Schlegel calls "the origin of all poetry" that "suspend[s] the notions and 
the laws of rational thought" (181); it is a language, in de Man' s words, "open to 
the radical arbitrariness of any sign system and as such capable of circulation, 
but which as such is profoundly unreliable" (181). It is at this point where de 
Man's view of irony emerges most clearly: irony is "a free play of the signifier," a 
kind of authentic language, or "words" that have their own ways of "saying" and 
"doing" things, while challenging the audience to face "a sheer circulation"; it 
enacts the "impossibility of understanding" (181). 
From this perspective, the scene that portrays Verloc's half-witted brother-in- 
law, Stevie, drawing circles seems to epitomize the kind of irony that the novel 
employs: 
Stevie, seated very good and quiet at a deal table, drawing circles, circles; 
innumerable circles, concentric, eccentric; a coruscating whirl of circles 
that by their tangled multitude of repeated curves, uniformity of form, 
and confusion of intersecting lines suggested a rendering of cosmic chaos, 
the symbolism of a mad art attempting the inconceivable. (76) 
The significance of Stevie's "concentric" and "eccentric" circles is multiple; they 
are a sigdier of "cosmic chaos," an indicator of the absence of any reliable truth 
or meaning. At the same time, these numerous circles can be read as a 
metaphor for the endless hermeneutic circles that the text engenders. Following 
de Man's lead and the invitation of this highly self-reflexive passage, we may 
argue that irony in the novel is a most apt mode for a "mad art" that wrestles 
2) What I have in mind here is the age-old association of moonlight with madness, as 
evident in the words like "moonstruck" or "lunatic." 
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with the problem of irony - the impossibility of understanding. To borrow de 
Man' s words again, irony in the novel poses a "threat" in its rigorous refusal to 
be contained by any hermeneutic or epistemological closure. However, the irony 
in the novel goes beyond "a free play of the signifler" or "sheer circulation" or 
randomness, complicating the terrain where de Manian irony operates. As we 
shall see, Conrad's irony is deeply engaged with a socio-political context that 
seems to be neglected in de Man's discussion of irony. The disruption of the 
illusion of truth and fixed meaning through irony in the novel is inseparable 
from the concern with the possibility of resisting and reformulating the 
seemingly "unattackable" society - a society which is oblivious to other people's 
suffering in its indiffence and conventionality. Embodying the novel's struggle 
with "the inconceivable," irony pursues the impossible horizon of resistance and 
change in a world insensible to its own ubiquitous injustice, absurdity, and 
misery. 
The excessive and mostly unjust disdain of the novel's narrator toward its 
characters have provoked many critics to attack the ethics of irony in the novel. 
Indeed, in many instances, the narrator's sarcastic mockery - which spares 
nobody in the novel, from the inapt anarchists and self-interested civil 
authorities to the compassionate idiot and sacrificial mother and sister - 
sounds too gratuitous and inhumane. A close reading, however, suggests that 
the narrative voice is much less consistent or firmly established than usually 
assumed. Belying some critics' assumptions about the ironic narrator armed 
with superior knowledge, the narrator directly or indirectly reveals his own 
contradictions and ignorance. For example, after his derisive depiction of 
Verloc's "fat-pig" style, the narrator suddenly concedes his lack of omniscience 
and confesses that he is "not sure" since he has not carried his "investigations so 
far in the depths" (21). 
As the novel proceeds, we come to see that, far from being simply a deceiving 
trap or an expression of chilling indifference, the narrator's denial of ornniscence 
reflects the entire narrative mode that constantly destabilizes its own narrative 
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ground. Note for example the scene where Vladimir, First Secretary of the 
(probably Russian) Embassy, pressures Verloc into the bombing of Greenwich 
Observatory. The passage reveals a curious affinity between Vladirnir and the 
narrator in their meanness and "epistemological will-to-power" of an ironist 
(Armstrong 91). Like Vladimir who immediately starts "formulat[ing] in his 
mind a series of disparaging remarks" at  the sight of "Mr. Verloc's face and 
figure" (311, the narrator sets forth "disparaging remarks" that mock the 
ineptitude of the anarchists: the temorist Yundt's "toothless gums" and the 
Professor's frail skull, which looked frail enough for Ossipon to crush between 
thumb and forefinger"(38). The recurrent image of Vladimir's huge "eyeglasses" 
evokes the drive for powerknowledge embedded in his ironic I/eye. As a man of 
"joke and witticism" (37), we are told, Vladimir "develops his idea from on high, 
with scorn and condescension" (35). And yet, the narrator is unaware of the 
similarity between Vladimir and himself, demonstrating that he shares the 
limited self-knowledge and sense of self-righteousness with the other characters. 
The text further goes on to disclose the psychological state of Vladimir, the 
ironist. In a free indirect discourse, we hear Vladimir's contemptuous view of 
Verloc: "this was then the famous and trusty secret agent, so secret that he was 
never designated otherwise but by the symbol A. . . . The celebrated agent A 
whose warnings had the power to change the scheme and the dates of royal, 
imperial, grand-ducal journeys. . . . ! This fellow!" (31). At this moment, the 
narrator intervenes and speaks: "Mr. Vladimir indulged mentally in an  
enormous and derisive fit of merriment" (31). To some extent, such a "fit of 
merriment" can be associated with "a mood of joyfulness" or "exultation" - a 
psychological state which D.C. Mueck sees induced by the ironist7s awareness of 
himself as the unobserved observer." Vladimir's confidence in his superior 
knowledge, however, turns out to be groundless, as the Assistant commissioner 
all too easily discovers that Vladimir; is the instigator of the bombing affair. 
Neither does the text give the narrator narrative authority. Verlock's surprise a t  
V l a W s  "amount of ignorance as to the real aims, thoughts, and methods of 
the revolutionary world" (64) betrays both the narratorlironist's impulse to 
deride Vladimir's sense of superiority and self-coniidence(via Verlocks's eyes) 
and his own limited knowlege - i.e., his failure to recognize the similarity 
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betweeen Vladimir and himself. The self-defeating circle of irony - that 
constantly makes the ironist a target of mockery - does not end here. At the 
very moment when the reader identifies how this kind of irony operates, the text 
challenges them to face their own "tempting pleasures of ascendancy," thus 
simultaneously reproducing and dismantling the very ground of irony 
(Armstrong 93). As shall be seen in the following, however, the politics of irony 
in The Secret Agent is not limited to the text's attack on what Armstrong calls 
the "epistemological will-to-power"(91). Contradictions and the lack of self- 
knowledge in the novel go beyond the endless circle of irony. They refer to one of 
the central questions that the novel agonizes over: is it possible or desirable 
indeed to have morally and politically correct beliefs to make a better world in 
the face of ubiquitous social injustice? 
Contradicting some critics' assumptions of the inhuman joke about the 
wretched, the narrator at one moment makes clear that "mocking an abject 
mankind in the most pressing of its miserable necessities" is "immoral" (103). 
From Armstrong's view, such a statement might be no better than another 
instance of contradictions that the novel exposes. According to Armstrong, 
sympathy in the novel is a case in point. Taking Stevie - whose compassion 
does not lead to anywhere but to his absurd death - as an example, Armstrong 
suggests that much of the irresoluble contradictions in the novel derives from 
the idea that neither derision nor sympathy works in the given world. That is to 
say, what the novel tells us is that while derision is immoral, sympathy is 
undesirable. 
The issue of sympathy is crucial to understanding irony in The Secret Agent. 
The issue is important, however, not in the sense that it helps us see irony as an 
expression of helpless despair at the ineffectiveness of sympathy. Rather, it is 
central to the text's rigorous attack on oppressive authority and domination, as 
it is deeply tied up with ethical, political, as well as epistemological questions 
that the novel grapples with. To put it differently, the question is not so much 
whether sympathy is desirable or not as what kind of sympathy is problematic, 
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or why sympathy fails. At this point, the sympathetic gesture of a wealthy 
patroness toward Michaelis is notable. In a party scene the lady is fascinated by 
the anarchist's "infant eyes" and "angelic smile" (961, whereas others regard him 
as "monstrous" (95). Irony here operates on a very complex horizon. It mocks 
both Michaelis' naive idealist belief in the future and the patroness' blind 
affection. As Michaelis' past unfolds, the guests' contempt at the anarchist 
becomes problematic as well. Because of his trivial role in the attempt to rescue 
some prisoners, he got a heavy sentence. He is after all a victim of unjust 
society. The seemingly opposite attitudes toward the anarchist become similar 
in that both of them represent the prevailing conventional mind that cannot 
accept any potential for social change. Indeed, as the narrative proceeds, the 
patroness' sympathy, which at first seems to be as futile as Stevie's blind 
compassion, takes on a more sinister significance. It becomes clear that behind 
the patroness' sympathetic fascination lies the horrifying placidity of her 
impregnable privilege, privilege that is not to be disturbed by any 'thought' of 
social change or revolt. Her "great capacity of pity," we are told, is possible 
precisely because she was "such a complete stranger" to any human misery. Her 
"lofty position" is so finnly secured that Michaelis' vision of the "disappearance 
of the last piece of money" does not disturb her at all, "she could not conceive 
how it[the eradication of capital system] could affect her position" (95). To some 
extent, the patroness' psyche mirrors those who protested against the court's 
unjust decision on behalf of Michaelis, people who in fact simply "wish[edl to 
exploit the sentimental aspect of his imprisonment for purposes of their own or 
for no intelligible purposen(93). As the text points to contingency and self- 
interest embedded even in seemingly admirable causes and activities the wall 
between those who laugh at and those who sympathize with the "harmless" 
anarchist collapses. All of them turn out to be inhabitants of an "unattackable" 
wasteland where the seed of revolt can't even be planted (85). 
Reading the patroness' sympathy in light of the paralyzing conventionality of 
the privileged enables us to look at an unexpected similarity between the Chief 
Inspector Heat and the patroness as well. At first glance, Heat is the opposite of 
the patroness; the former criminalizes Michaelis while the latter believes in this 
man's innocence. As a matter of fact, however, both Heat and the patroness try 
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to tame the ex-convict; the former by criminalizing so as to incarcerate him 
again, and the latter by infantalizing, romanticizing, and thus disarming this 
man. As in the case of the patroness, "the mind of Chief Inspector Heat was 
inaccessible to ideas of revolt" (82). 
This does not mean, of course, to negate Michaelis' ineptitude as  a 
revolutionary activist. Among other things, his failure to maintain any sound 
relationship with people undercuts his socialist dream of reforming the world. 
While he constantly seeks to communicate with people, he is totally estranged 
from them in his "indifference" and "mental solitude" that preclude the 
possibility for communication. Part of his disconnection with people, we need to 
remember derives from his 20 years of incarceration. And yet, it also indicates 
the ubiquitous indifference in the entire society, indifference that withers the 
seed of revolution. 
The long narrative about a man called Professor X further demonstrates that 
irony in the novel is rooted in a profound anguish about the psychological and 
social conditions that paralyze the human agency for resistance and change. 
Irony here points to the vulnerability of the human psyche - the psyche that 
easily falls prey to the very vice that it seeks to attack - as  well as the 
predominant "conventional morality" and "indifference." Carrying explosives 
fastened to his body, Professor X works hard to invent a perfect detonator to 
blow up the entire human being for a fresh start for the future. As in the cases of 
the other anarchists, what seems most obviously ironic about this "perfect 
anarchist" - whether we laugh at  him with the narrator or not - comes from 
the discrepancy between his deformed, tiny little body that incarnates his fear of 
mankind and his grandiose desire for revolution. To some extent, he seems to be 
disringuished from the other anarchists in his subversive language and insight. 
For example, his contention that both the anarchists and the police are trapped 
within conventional norms epitomizes one of the novel's central social criticisms, 
tempting us to view him as a truly rebellious spirit. Indeed, Professor X asserts 
his independence from all other people whose enslavement to "conventional 
morality" sustains the dominant "social ordern(63). He says to Comrade Ossipon, 
one of Verloc7s anarchist associates: 'You revolutionists . . . are the slaves of the 
social convention. . . slaves of it as much as the very police that stands up in the 
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defence of that convention. . . . You are not a bit better than the forces arrayed 
against you . . . than the police, for instance. . . . The terrorist and the policeman 
both come from the same basket. Revolution, legality . . . forms of idleness at  
bottom identical. . . . I've the grit to work alone, quite alone, absolutely alone. . . . 
I t  is I who am the true propagandist" (93-94). "He quarrelled with the 
authorities upon a question of unfair treatment" (98) and he always dreams of "a 
blow fit to open the first crack in the imposing front of the great edifice of legal 
conceptions sheltering the atrocious injustice of society" (101-2). 
And yet, the ft3llowing passage once again mars Professor X's political 
potential. 
Of humble origin: and with an appearance really so mean as to stand in 
the way of his considerable natural abilities, his imagination had been 
fired early by the tales of men rising from the depths of poverty to 
positions of authority and affluence. The extreme, almost ascetic purity of 
his thought, combined with an astounding ignorance of worldly 
conditions, had set before him a goal of power and prestige to be attained 
without the medium of arts, graces, tack, wealth - by sheer weight of 
merit alone. On that view he considered himself entitled to undisputed 
success. . . . He nursed it k i s  ambition] as something secularly holy. To 
see it thwarted opened his eyes to the true nature of the world, whose 
morality was artificial, corrupt and blasphemous. The way of even the 
most justifiable revolutions is prepared by personal impulses disguised 
into creeds. The Professor' s indignation found in itselfa h a l  cause that 
absolved him from the sin of turning to destruction as the agent of his 
ambition. To destroy public faith in legality was the imperfect formula of 
his pedantic fanaticism. . . . He was a moral agent - that was settled in 
his mind. By exercising his agency with ruthless defiance he procured for 
himself the appearances of power and personal prestige. That was 
undeniable to his vengeful bitterness. It pacified its unrest; and in their 
own way the most ardent of revolutionaries are perhaps doing no more 
but seeking for peace in common with the rest of mankind -the peace of 
soothed vanity, of satisfied appetites, or perhaps of appeased conscience. 
Lost in the crowd, miserable and undersized, he meditated confidently on 
his power. . . . (102) 
My suggestion is that the instability of the narrative perspective on Professor X 
is inseparable from the issues of the possibility of resistance and commitment. 
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The passage starts with a subtle but balanced criticism of both the  social 
injustice tha t  victiinizes the Professor and the naivety of the latter. The 
narrative then goes on to expose the hidden affinity between the Professor and 
the corrupt world, as exemplified by his penchant for power. Furthermore, 
despite Professor X's indignation at  the "true nature of the u7orld" - the world 
where every socio-political activity is motivated by individual interests and 
desire for power - he himself yields to such fault, thus pointing to his lack of 
self-knowledge. Along with this, the seemingly righteous urge of Professor X to 
rebel turns out to be no better than "vengeful bitterness,'' inviting us to look a t  
his anger in terms of Nietzschean "1,essentiment." His fuming anger remains 
within the boundary of the dominant social order as far as it is tied up with the 
secret yeanling for power. The Professor's anger loses its subversive edge as it 
partakes the very vice of the society. The image of him "lost in the crowd casts a 
dubious light on his potential to revolutionize the world, intimating the affinity 
between him and other people as well. 
As typical of the entire text, the irony does not stup here. I t  always urges the 
reader to confront their own problems and limits. The image of the crowd 
wherein F'rofessor X is lost once again evokes the horrible stasis of the psyche 
that fails to conceive the very idea of change and revolt. The Chief inspector 
Heat's. musings on thieves and anarchists after the bombing affair are worth 
noting a t  this  point. I n  contrast with the  work of thieves, Heat sees the  
anarchist's plot as totally unreadable and incomprehensible: 
The complexion of that case had somehow forced upon him the general 
idea of the absurdity of things human, which in the abstract is 
sufficiently annoying to an unphilosophical temperament. . . . At the 
beginning of his career Chief Inspector Heat had been concerned with the 
more energetic forms of thieving. . . . Thieving was not, a sheer absurdity. 
It was a form of human industry, perverse indeed, but still an industry 
exercised in an industrious world. . . . They [thieves] submitted to the 
severe sanctions of a morality familiar to Chief Inspector Heat with a 
certain resignation. They were his fellow-citizens gone wrong because of 
imperfect education, Chief Inspector Heat believed; but allowing for that 
difference, he could understand the mind of a burglar, because, as a 
matter of fact, the mind and the instincts of a burglar are of the same 
kind as the mind and the instincts of a police officer. Both recognize the 
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same conventions, and have a working knowledge of each other's 
methods and of the routine of their respective trades. . . . Products of the 
same machine, one classed as useful and the other as noxious, they take 
the machine for granted in different ways, but with a seriousness 
essentially the same. The mind of Chief Inspector Heat was inaccessible 
to ideas of revolt. But his thieves were not rebels. . . . He had felt himself 
revered and admired. And Chief Inspector Heat, arrested within six 
paces of the anarchist nicknamed the Professor, gave a thought of regret 
to the world of thieves - sane, without morbid ideals, working by 
routine, respectful of constituted authorities, fi-ee from all taint of hate 
and despair. (110-11) 
In a sense, the effect of the bombing affair on Heat is what exactly Vladimir 
aimed a t ;  Vladimir insisted to Verloc that  their activity should be sheer 
absurdity tha t  operates in a realm beyond any conventional philosophical, 
ethical, or political norms. Unlike thieves, whose elcistence serves only to secure 
Heat's authority through their confinement within the bounds of conventionality 
and comprehensibility, anarchists are to be ''rebel[s]" who challenge the power of 
this civil authority. But then the text immediately takes another direction, 
disrupting this interpretation. Heat's inability to gain access to "ideas of revolt" 
and his preoccupation with his own power games with his immediate superior, 
t h e  Assistance Commissioner, t ransform th i s  potential ly subversive 
incomprehensible affair into a joke. What happens a t  this moment is the 
triumph of the conventional psyche, which regulates even this absurd activity by 
filing it under the simple name of madness. 
The problem immediately before the Chief Inspector was that of 
managing the Assistant Commissioner of his department, his immediate 
superior. This its the perennial problem of trusty and loyal servants; 
anarchism gave it its particular complexion, but nothing more. Truth to 
say, Chief Inspector Heat thought but little of anarchism. He did not 
attach undue importance to it, and could never bring himself to consider 
it seriously. . . . And recalling the Professor, Chief Inspector Heat, 
without checking his swinging pace, muttered through his teeth: 
"Lunatic."(ll3-14) 
The dramatic irony that arises from Heat's failure to consider Professor X even 
"A Mad Art Attempt~ng the Inconceivable": 35 
as a possible suspect mockingly points to the failure of the "urattackable" mind, 
the mind that cannot conceive the idea of revolt. It is this kind of conceptual, 
epistemological, and political condition of the society that engenders and is 
challenged by irony. 
Indeed, one of the most fearful questions that haunts the novel is how to resist 
the repressive, unjust society in the face of the incredible stasis that threatens to 
tame even most absurd activity. From the first the story is set against the 
backdrop of a London that is depicted as "hav[ing] the majesty of inorganic 
nature, of matter that never dies" (21), hinting at the unchangeable world. In 
this respect, for all his limitations and ignorance, Vladinlir's justification of an 
attack on the Greenwich Observatory is notable to the extent that it touches on 
the question of how to make a difference in this world which seems to be 
immune to change. Vladimir's contention that only an "incomprehensible, 
inexplicable, almost unthinkable" act of "madness" can make a slightest 
influence on the indifferent, stolid the middle-class reflects the novel's 
underlying wish and despair. Conrad's seemingly passing remark that "there 
had been moments during the writing of the book when I was an extreme 
revolutionist" (11) becomes illuminating at this point. As Professor X succinctly 
puts it, the novel is driven by a question, "what if nothing could move them 
[mankind]?", a question posed by his confrontation with a society where people 
have become too indifferent to feel anything about agony of their fellow human 
beings and too conventionalized to conceive the idea of resistance or revolt (74). 
5. 
In sum, much of the multifaceted and abundant irony in The Secret Agent is 
generated by the novel's confrontation with a difficult question: is it possible to 
change, or a t  least, communicate human despair and suffering in the 
contemporary society that is incapable of conceiving, imagining, or naming the 
very word revolution in its freezing indifference bred by affluence, conformity, 
and self-deception? Throughout the novel irony constantly dismantles the 
illusion of absolute truth by producing endless dynamics of meaning, thus 
shattering and interrogating the very ground on which irony operates. This does 
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not mean, however, to confine irony to sheer randomness. Through the 
persistent combat with fixation and rationalization, irony challenges the 
"unattackable stolidity" of the world, while desperately distancing itself from a 
position of superior knowledge or self-defeating and self-deceiving sympathy. In 
its mad art, irony in The Secret Agent reaches out for "the inconceivable" horizon 
of resistance and change in its unending fight with epistemolgical, moral, and 
political illusions of closure and stasis. 
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